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  On July 27, 2008, the U.S. Senate passed and 
sent on to the president the “Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 2008,” reportedly the most 
important hosing bill since the Great Depression. 
The bill was originally aimed at addressing the 
foreclosure crisis which began in late 2006 and 
became especially apparent in the financial crisis 
that emerged in August 2007.  Its passage was ac-
celerated by the near or real failures of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the nation’s two largest govern-
ment sponsored enterprises (GSEs), who play a 
central role in the functioning of the nation’s hous-
ing, mortgage and financial markets. It is unlikely 
that the new steps will have much effect on the 
foreclosure crisis or short-term economic perform-
ance, but they create serious uncertainty over the 
future of the GSEs, federal finance and the status 
and role of the U.S. financial markets.  It is likely, 
however,  that the new arrangements for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac will not remain static for 
more than a few months and that newly authorized 
steps for the new regulator of the GSEs are likely 
to ramp up the discussion and need for regulation 
soon.  
 
The New Housing Bill 
 The new bill was originally aimed at providing 
relief to the mortgage foreclosure crisis. At the end 
of the first quarter of 2008, 2.5 percent of all mort-
gages were in the foreclosure process, up from 
about 1 percent in mid 2006. This was largely due 
to the growing foreclosures among subprime loans, 
which climbed to a 10.7 percent rate from about a 
3.5 percent rate in 2005. Owners of about 1.5 mil-
lion homes entered foreclosure over the past year 
and this is expected to climb to about 2.5 million 
over the next year (see Tatom 2008 for a fuller de-
scription of the foreclosure problem and its ef-
fects).     
 The new bill expands upon efforts to use Fed-
eral Housing Administration lending to refinance 
problem loans about to enter foreclosure. In the 
new bill, mortgage holders spending more than 31 
percent of their income on housing (principal, in-
terest, property taxes and insurance) can refinance 
with FHA. They must first obtain their lender’s 
willingness to take a 10 percent “haircut” on the 
remaining balance of the loan.  Mortgage holders 
must also be capable of paying the new loan and 
they must agree to pay the federal government half 
of any capital gain they might receive on a sale of 
the home within the first five years that it is out-
standing.  Congress appropriated $300 billion for 
these new loans, expecting to help up to 400,000 
people, but this total could rise to up to 2 million 
mortgages holders if more are qualified than ex-
pected. This provision ends September 30, 2011.  
 Ironically, the program does not begin until 
October 2008, and, based on recent trends, as many 
as 400,000 mortgages are likely to enter foreclo-
sure by then. This reflects the most obvious short-
coming of the bill: it is too late and too little to 
make a serious dent in the foreclosure problem.  
Perhaps 40 percent of the homeowners faced with 
the foreclosure problem will have already lost their 
homes before the program begins, and fewer than 
20 percent of the remainder will be able to obtain 
some relief from this program. Moreover, even for 
the few borrowers who are assisted, the foreclosure 
rate on the group obtaining FHA loans will remain 
relatively high, despite the positive factor that the 
FHA loans are fixed rate mortgages and will 
largely replace higher default, variable rate mort-
gages. For example, in the first quarter of 2008, the 
FHA loan foreclosure rate was 2.4 percent, about 
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the same as the national average, but double the 
foreclosure rate on prime mortgages.     
 There are many other aspects of the housing 
bill aimed at subsidizing housing activity besides 
the foreclosure refinancing scheme. The bill pro-
vides about $4 billion for local government pro-
grams to redevelop abandoned and foreclosed 
homes, one of the most controversial components 
of spending in the bill. Other stimulus to the hous-
ing market includes a first-time buyer tax credit of 
up to $7500, funds for housing counseling of about 
$180 million, improved benefits for veterans, in-
cluding a moratorium on foreclosures of military 
mortgages of servicemen returning from foreign 
conflicts, a one-year property tax deductibility for 
non-itemizing taxpayers on the first $1000 for 
taxes, and many others.  
 
Reforming and Reviving the GSEs   
 The most sweeping and costly actions in the 
housing bill are aimed at regulatory reform and 
saving the insolvent housing-related GSEs, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. According to Poole (2008), 
Fannie and Freddie (hereafter Fan and Fred) are 
already insolvent.  These institutions were created 
by Congress and granted federal charters as pri-
vately held corporations, originally to provide li-
quidity to the nation’s housing markets and to pro-
vide affordable housing programs desired by the 
government. Under the bill, Congress granted tem-
porary authority for the Secretary of Treasury to 
purchase debt or stock in unlimited amounts from 
Fan and Fred or the Federal Home Loan Banks.  
This made official the unlimited line of credit 
backed by the full faith and credit of the United 
States, which had long been assumed by financial 
markets. 
 The bill also provides for a single regulator, the 
Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA), for 
these organizations, replacing the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and the 
Federal Housing Finance Board, which had super-
vised the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, the or-
phans of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
which was abolished as part of the Savings and 
Loan reforms of the early 1990s. The first head of 
FHFA will be Dennis B. Lockhart III, the current 
head of OFHEO, until he is replaced by the next 
president. The expectation is that the new regulator 
will toughen capital requirements and provide 
closer scrutiny over the GSEs, especially now that 
Congress has clarified the legal standing of the 
GSEs as essentially public enterprises.   
 Interestingly, the new bill also requires that 
Fred and Fan pay a tax of 4.2 basis points on each 
dollar of unpaid balance of each enterprise’s total 
new mortgage purchases. Presumably, this is to 
remove some of the advantage of their government 
related low cost of funds, and to offset some of the 
new higher costs of FHA lending. It is not suffi-
cient to fully offset the lower cost of capital of the 
GSEs and will continue the disadvantages that pri-
vate mortgage holders face in competing with 
them.   
 One of the greatest problems presented by the 
new bill’s treatment of Fred and Fan is their recapi-
talization.  The GSEs were long believed to be sub-
stantially undercapitalized, and plans in Congress 
as recently as last spring looked for the capital re-
quirements to be substantially raised with the addi-
tion of private sector financing.  A March 2008 
estimate of their capital, at about $80 billion, was 
far less than banks of equal size would be required 
to hold. But raising new capital will be difficult so 
long as the possibility of being taken over by the 
receiver is possible. 
 Another major problem is the size of the poten-
tial budgetary cost. The Congressional Budget Of-
fice (2008) estimates the cost of the GSE exposure 
to be $25 billion. However, the potential cost is 
much greater than this.  Suppose that the number of 
foreclosures rises to about 4 percent from the first 
quarter 2008 level of 2.4 percent, and further sup-
pose that the GSEs are equally exposed, which may 
be an overstatement of their exposure. Further sup-
pose that, in a typical foreclosure, 50 percent of 
value is recoverable, a fairly standard assumption.  
In this event, the GSEs would lose about $30 bil-
lion on their books and another $70 billion on out-
standing guarantees, a total of $100 billion. The 
GSEs had capital of about $80 billion in March 
2008 and had already taken losses of $11 billion.  
Thus the expected cost to the Treasury would be 
about $9 billion under this scenario, ignoring the 
undercapitalization of the GSEs that would then 
exist. The latter cost is likely to be over $86 billion 
for the mortgages on the books of the GSEs; a fur-
ther 4 percent is necessary to cover the cost of 
guarantees under the assumed default experience.  
Thus the total cost to the Treasury could be as 
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much as $230 billion, or more depending on the 
extent of losses over the next year at the GSEs.  
The CBO assumes that there is only a five percent 
chance of a loss greater than $100 billion and a 50 
percent chance of no direct cost to the Treasury, 
but this ignores a reasonable estimate of the ex-
pected losses and costs to bring these firms up to 
private sector standards for capital.  
 
The Future of Fred and Fan 
 The failure of Fred and Fan prompted many of 
their critics to rejoice, declaring “I told you so,” 
and in some cases projecting the end of their lives 
as government sponsored entities or as independent 
agencies of government. Many financial market 
leaders, on the other hand, celebrated the recogni-
tion that the government stands behind Fan and 
Fred and expected the enterprises to be refinanced 
at public and private expense, in the latter case 
with clear recognition by the government that Fan 
and Fred would ultimately be going concerns as 
GSEs with explicit backing of the government. 
Neither side is likely to be satisfied; indeed, all 
sides face as much uncertainty about the future of 
Fred and Fan as they did before the new law was 
passed. Poole (2008) has called for the eventual 
privatization of Fred and Fan in five to ten years.  
If the firms can survive that long, it is most 
unlikely that they will be as weak as today and that 
they can be fully privatized.  Former Secretary of 
Treasury Lawrence Summers (2008b) has pointed 
out the impossibility of sustainable GSEs under the 
previous arrangements and he has (2008a) called 
for them to be put in receivership and, in “several 
years,” privatized.  “Several years” is likely to be 
sooner than five or ten years, with the length of 
time conditioned upon the end of the financial cri-
sis, which is not imminent.       
 The recent actions and prospects are largely 
affected by perceptions of the effects of the impos-
ing size of Fred and Fan. They hold about 15 per-
cent of all mortgages and they guarantee another 
35 percent or so of the remainder of mortgages.  
Their exit from the market would be a catastrophic 
event for the U.S. and global financial markets, in 
the minds of many observers. Certainly in the cur-
rent financial environment, any such large change 
could have serious ramifications. As recently as 
2007, Fred and Fan restricted their purchases of 
mortgages to about 15 percent of the market, as 
noted by Poole (2008), with no obvious effect on 
housing, mortgage or financial markets.  A further 
cut to zero would have had little more effect, ex-
cept perhaps for a temporary one based on expecta-
tions or announcement.  The threat to ending guar-
antees is more serious according to many analysts. 
The most credible estimates suggest that Fred and 
Fan have lowered conforming mortgage interest 
rates by less than 10 basis points and may have had 
no significant effects on primary or secondary mar-
ket spreads; the latter result is independent of 
whether the firms have added to their own 
“owned” portfolio or securitized loans with a guar-
antee (see Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess 2005 
and Lehnert, Passmore and Sherlund 2006).  
 The exposure of the government to the insol-
vency of Fred and Fan creates an unsustainable 
situation. The firms are still private, in the sense 
that they have listed stock, stockholders and pay 
dividends.  As Poole has noted, they have very 
large lobbying and political contribution budgets 
and they also pay very large salaries that are com-
petitive with private financial institutions.  The 
new bill gives the FHFA power to influence sala-
ries and other operating expenditures.  The biggest 
problem going forward is that there is a strong case 
to privatize the activities of Fred and Fan, though 
the recent insolvency complicates this effort.  Pre-
sumably the new regulator could declare the firms 
to be insolvent and take control as the receiver un-
der newly defined receivership powers. Problem-
atic budgets could be eliminated immediately, and 
the claims of common and preferred stockholders 
and subordinated debt holders could be wiped out. 
Restrictions on new business and an orderly proc-
ess reducing the exposure could begin immedi-
ately, as well as efforts to privatize components of 
the firms with sufficient capital to be attractive to 
private sector bidders. Eventually the receiver 
would have to sell off the less desirable remaining 
assets and assume the remaining liabilities of the 
firms.  
 One putative problem, taking the debt of Fred 
and Fan on the federal budget, is an issue in the 
minds of some analysts, but taking them on budget 
would simply be a clear recognition of what was 
already known with a high degree of certainty.  
Moreover, those debts come with assets that are 
nearly as large, so that the creditworthiness of the 
U.S. government would not likely be impaired.  
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For those fooled by accounting constructs, the ini-
tial structure (but not the extended life) of the 
Resolution Trust Company could be emulated, un-
der the FHFA to keep the gross debt of Fred and 
Fan off the books.  
 Working against such an effort is the fact that 
Fan and Fred have long standing and strong politi-
cal support in Congress because of their bureau-
cratic and political largess, as well as their support 
for political agendas. Numerous efforts over the 
past two decades, at least, have failed to reign in or 
to privatize their activities.  The current weakness 
of Fan and Fred could eventually be overcome un-
der government control and pressures would be 
exceedingly strong to remove some of the federal 
oversight from these firms, especially if the exist-
ing board and ownership structure remain in place. 
It is far too premature to believe that the problems 
of Fan and Fred for financial markets, housing 
markets and politicians are about to end.  Indeed, 
without immediate attention to ending the federal 
charter and link to the nation’s Treasury, Fan and 
Fred are likely to rise again.               
 The new housing bill has been debated for al-
most a year, but it has become a symbol of a much 
larger effort to enhance government regulation and 
its role in the economy, especially since July 13, 
2008 when the Secretary Paulson announced the 
importance of making official the government 
backing of GSE debt (2008a).  This appeared to be 
a major departure from the U.S. Treasury’s (2008b 
and c) call for regulatory modernization and im-
provement of private sector competitiveness in the 
blueprint announced less than four months earlier, 
at least in the sense that the plan called for stream-
lining and simplifying regulation and role of the 
government in order to lessen its burden and im-
prove the competitiveness of the nation’s financial 
industry. It may be premature to suggest that regu-
latory reform to lighten the burden of regulation is 
no longer on Treasury’s agenda (see Davis et al 
2008), but the tone and content of recent discus-
sions call for an enhanced role of the Federal Re-
serve (Fed) and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in regulating products and market activi-
ties in ways not seen before in the United States. 
For example, the Treasury and the Fed endorsed 
Fed lending to Fred and Fan, though the Fed was 
quick to indicate that this is not likely because it is 
incompatible with their “lender-of-last-resort” pol-
icy and is not likely to be necessary. The latter pol-
icy has been changed dramatically in the past year, 
however (see Tatom 2008).  The Treasury Secre-
tary insists that a new consultative role for the Fed 
in setting capital requirements and prudential stan-
dards that require new congressional authority in 
the housing bill is consistent with the “de facto 
market stability regulator” role envisioned in the 
Blueprint.  Perhaps the new role of financial mar-
ket stability czar is the exception to the government 
restraint otherwise envisioned in the Treasury’s 
blueprint. In any event, recent emergency steps 
may simply disguise the new course of the nation’s 
financial leadership.     
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